“This child was raped in a church office by a minister, and a duly
empaneled jury established an appropriate level of compensation for the loss of
her childhood innocence. We have no right to interfere with that process. Shame
on the General Assembly. The children are watching. And I for one do not like
what they are seeing.”
“I cannot accept the proposition that a teenager who is raped by a pastor fits into a preordained formula for damages. Are we really ready to affirm the legislature’s decision to say to a future victim, “we don’t know you, we don’t know the facts of your case, and we don’t know what a duly empaneled jury is going to say, but your damages are a maximum of $500,000?” No parent of a teenage daughter would accept that outcome as being just.”This blog has previously addressed how Ohio law is highly favorable to businesses, especially as compared to other states. One major way that Ohio law favors businesses is the cap on “compensatory tort damages” for “noneconomic loss.”
empaneled jury established an appropriate level of compensation for the loss of
her childhood innocence. We have no right to interfere with that process. Shame
on the General Assembly. The children are watching. And I for one do not like
what they are seeing.”
“I cannot accept the proposition that a teenager who is raped by a pastor fits into a preordained formula for damages. Are we really ready to affirm the legislature’s decision to say to a future victim, “we don’t know you, we don’t know the facts of your case, and we don’t know what a duly empaneled jury is going to say, but your damages are a maximum of $500,000?” No parent of a teenage daughter would accept that outcome as being just.”This blog has previously addressed how Ohio law is highly favorable to businesses, especially as compared to other states. One major way that Ohio law favors businesses is the cap on “compensatory tort damages” for “noneconomic loss.”
Pursuant to RC 2315.18(B)(2), this type of damages (which encompasses “pain and suffering,
loss of society, consortium, companionship, care, assistance, attention, protection,
advice, guidance, counsel, instruction, training, or education, disfigurement,
mental anguish, and any other intangible loss”) is capped at “the greater of two
hundred fifty thousand dollars or an amount that is equal to three
times the economic loss, as determined by the trier of fact, of the
plaintiff in that tort action to a maximum of three hundred fifty
thousand dollars for each plaintiff in that tort action or a maximum
of five hundred thousand dollars for each occurrence that is the
basis of that tort action.” There is also a cap on punitive damages, though that is a subject for another blog post.
The case of Simpkins v. Grace Brethren Church of Delaware, Ohio illustrates how brutally unfair this cap can be. A 15-year old girl who was raped by the senior pastor at Sunbury Grace Brethren Church in Delaware, Ohio filed a lawsuit. Obviously she was immensely traumatized. A Delaware County jury awarded her over $3.5 million in total compensatory damages, but the Judge reduced the award to only $350,000. So, the bad actors (including the church, which knew of two previous instances of sexual misconduct by the pastor yet still kept him on board and even promoted him) get a huge break. In a 3-2 decision (two Justices did not vote either way, but rather preferred to dismiss the appeal on procedural grounds as having been “improvidently accepted”), the Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with the Fifth District Court of Appeals, finding that the maximum amount of noneconomic damages the Plaintiff could be awarded was $350,000.
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 63} I join Justice O’Neill’s excellent dissent.
{¶ 64} “Tort reform,” however misguided and unconstitutional, was
designed to protect doctors and corporate interests. See Arbino v. Johnson &
Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d. 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 163 (Pfeifer,
J., dissenting). Today, we learn that “tort reform,” not surprisingly, had
unintended consequences. It turns out that “tort reform” (and the justices who
sanctioned it) also ensured that rapists and those who enable them will not have to
pay the full measure of the damages they cause—even if they rape a child. It is
past time for the General Assembly (and this court) to reconsider “tort reform”
and return the authority to determine damages to juries, where it rightfully and
constitutionally belongs.
{¶ 64} “Tort reform,” however misguided and unconstitutional, was
designed to protect doctors and corporate interests. See Arbino v. Johnson &
Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d. 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 163 (Pfeifer,
J., dissenting). Today, we learn that “tort reform,” not surprisingly, had
unintended consequences. It turns out that “tort reform” (and the justices who
sanctioned it) also ensured that rapists and those who enable them will not have to
pay the full measure of the damages they cause—even if they rape a child. It is
past time for the General Assembly (and this court) to reconsider “tort reform”
and return the authority to determine damages to juries, where it rightfully and
constitutionally belongs.
O’NEILL, J., dissenting.
{¶ 65} I must dissent from the court’s decision on the first proposition of
law. I cannot accept the proposition that a teenager who is raped by a pastor fits
into a preordained formula for damages. Are we really ready to affirm the
legislature’s decision to say to a future victim, “we don’t know you, we don’t
know the facts of your case, and we don’t know what a duly empaneled jury is
going to say, but your damages are a maximum of $500,000?” No parent of a
teenage daughter would accept that outcome as being just.
law. I cannot accept the proposition that a teenager who is raped by a pastor fits
into a preordained formula for damages. Are we really ready to affirm the
legislature’s decision to say to a future victim, “we don’t know you, we don’t
know the facts of your case, and we don’t know what a duly empaneled jury is
going to say, but your damages are a maximum of $500,000?” No parent of a
teenage daughter would accept that outcome as being just.
{¶ 66} A plaintiff’s damages, in terms of pain and suffering and future
medical costs, could be astronomical. Or they could be nothing. Our system of
civil justice leaves that question for the jury to decide, not the General Assembly.
That is the point: a cookie-cutter approach simply does not work. In this case, a
duly empaneled jury heard all the facts and found the damages to be over $3.6
million. By reducing that award to $500,000, the trial court has removed the jury
from the process. If the General Assembly can limit damages for claims to
$500,000, or $350,000, what would prevent it from limiting damages to $1?
Would the court find that result to be constitutional? As stated by Justice Pfeifer
in his well-reasoned dissent in Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d.
468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 170, “the General Assembly does not
have this power; only the people by the amendment process have this power.
After today, what meaning is left in a litigant’s constitutional right to have a jury
determine damages?”
medical costs, could be astronomical. Or they could be nothing. Our system of
civil justice leaves that question for the jury to decide, not the General Assembly.
That is the point: a cookie-cutter approach simply does not work. In this case, a
duly empaneled jury heard all the facts and found the damages to be over $3.6
million. By reducing that award to $500,000, the trial court has removed the jury
from the process. If the General Assembly can limit damages for claims to
$500,000, or $350,000, what would prevent it from limiting damages to $1?
Would the court find that result to be constitutional? As stated by Justice Pfeifer
in his well-reasoned dissent in Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d.
468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 170, “the General Assembly does not
have this power; only the people by the amendment process have this power.
After today, what meaning is left in a litigant’s constitutional right to have a jury
determine damages?”
{¶ 67} Justice Pfeifer further noted in his dissent in Arbino:
“So long as the trial by jury is a part of our system of
jurisprudence, its constitutional integrity and importance should be
jealously safeguarded. The right of trial by jury should be as
inviolate in the working of our courts as it is in the wording of our Constitutions.” Gibbs v. Girard (1913), 88 Ohio St. 34, 47, 102
N.E. 299. Instead of jealously safeguarding the right to trial by
jury, the majority opinion in this case eviscerates it by holding
constitutional a statute that enables courts to “enter judgments in
disregard of the jury’s verdict.” Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994), 69
Ohio St.3d 415, 422, 633 N.E.2d 504. Instead of jealously
safeguarding the right to trial by jury, the majority opinion
employs shallow reasoning and shoddy logic in concluding that
juries can meaningfully determine only facts that do not conflict
with predetermined assessments of the General Assembly. Instead
of jealously safeguarding the right to trial by jury, the majority
opinion “cleans the scalpel for the legislature to cut away
unrestrainedly at the whole field of tort redress.” Meech v.
Hillhaven W., Inc. (1989), 238 Mont. 21, 52, 776 P.2d 488
(Sheehy, J., dissenting).
Id. at ¶ 163.
“So long as the trial by jury is a part of our system of
jurisprudence, its constitutional integrity and importance should be
jealously safeguarded. The right of trial by jury should be as
inviolate in the working of our courts as it is in the wording of our Constitutions.” Gibbs v. Girard (1913), 88 Ohio St. 34, 47, 102
N.E. 299. Instead of jealously safeguarding the right to trial by
jury, the majority opinion in this case eviscerates it by holding
constitutional a statute that enables courts to “enter judgments in
disregard of the jury’s verdict.” Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994), 69
Ohio St.3d 415, 422, 633 N.E.2d 504. Instead of jealously
safeguarding the right to trial by jury, the majority opinion
employs shallow reasoning and shoddy logic in concluding that
juries can meaningfully determine only facts that do not conflict
with predetermined assessments of the General Assembly. Instead
of jealously safeguarding the right to trial by jury, the majority
opinion “cleans the scalpel for the legislature to cut away
unrestrainedly at the whole field of tort redress.” Meech v.
Hillhaven W., Inc. (1989), 238 Mont. 21, 52, 776 P.2d 488
(Sheehy, J., dissenting).
Id. at ¶ 163.
{¶ 68} The only way to bypass the Ohio Constitution and make changes to
the tort system in Ohio would be by constitutional amendment. Unless and until
that happens, arbitrary caps on damages are unconstitutional.
the tort system in Ohio would be by constitutional amendment. Unless and until
that happens, arbitrary caps on damages are unconstitutional.
{¶ 69} This child was raped in a church office by a minister, and a duly
empaneled jury established an appropriate level of compensation for the loss of
her childhood innocence. We have no right to interfere with that process. Shame
on the General Assembly. The children are watching. And I for one do not like
what they are seeing.
empaneled jury established an appropriate level of compensation for the loss of
her childhood innocence. We have no right to interfere with that process. Shame
on the General Assembly. The children are watching. And I for one do not like
what they are seeing.
{¶ 70} I would reverse the decision of the trial court and reinstate the
judgment of the jury.
judgment of the jury.
